Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling by Markus Brunnermeier et al.
1 
 
Liquidity Mismatch Measurement 
 Markus Brunnermeier, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Gary Gorton
1 
January 18, 2012 
 
Policy-makers  and  academics  recognize  that  liquidity  is  central  in  the 
dynamics of a financial crisis, and that measurement of liquidity is critical in 
evaluating  and  regulating  systemic  risk.
2  The  proposed  Basel  Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio, for example, calls for banks to maintain a sufficient buffer of 
liquid assets to cover outflows over the next thirty days.   
 
Systemic  risk  depends  primarily  on  the  endogenous  response  of  market 
participants to extreme events. Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy’s 
(2012) “Risk Topography” approach takes explicitly endogenous responses 
into account when collecting data on the value and liquidity factor exposure 
of  major  institutions.  The  liquidity  measure  is  a  key  response  indicator. 
Market participants react to the same shock very differently depending on 
whether  they  face  a  lack  of  liquidity  or  they  are  flush  with  liquidity.  In 
addition, aggregate liquidity measures are important to detect a build-up of 
systemic risk in the background during a run-up phase. 
 
The academic literature on liquidity has identified many different aspects of 
liquidity  that  are  important  in  crises,  ranging  from  a  bank’s  reliance  on 
short-term debt, to its overall funding liquidity, to the market liquidity of its 
assets.    The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  measurement  of 
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liquidity in light of the academic research on liquidity.  That is, the “liquidity” 
in a given academic paper is often a highly stylized concept.  The questions 
we seek to answer are: 
 
(a)  What is the practical and measured counterpart of the theoretical 
concept of liquidity suggested by models?   
(b)  If one is interested in a liquidity measure that is informative about 
systemic risk, what measure does the academic research suggest? 
 
Answers  to  these  questions  can  inform  regulatory  thinking  on  liquidity 
regulations  as  well  as  further  academic  research  in  empirically  testing 
models of liquidity and crises. 
 
We propose a liquidity (risk) measure that looks at the worst x percent of 
the stress scenarios. For each stress scenario and for each asset and liability 
a cash equivalent dollar value is assigned assuming that all counterparties 
withdraw as much funds as possible in this scenario.  
 
Liquidity in Theoretical Models 
 
Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  is  the  canonical  model  emphasizing  the 
importance of “funding liquidity” for understanding financial crises. In this 
model,  it  is  not  the  borrowing  or  leverage  of  the  financial  sector  that  is 
salient,  but  rather  the  proportion  of  debt  that  is  comprised  of  short-term 
demandable  deposits.  More  broadly,  the  banking  literature  concludes  that 
when the financial sector holds illiquid assets financed by short-term debt, 
the possibility of run behavior emerges and, in turn, can precipitate a crisis.   
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Brunnermeier  and  Pedersen  (2009)  model  the  interaction  between  an 
institution’s ability to raise funds (“funding liquidity”) and the liquidity of the 
assets when it sells them (“market liquidity”).  Here, when funding liquidity 
falls the institution provides less liquidity in the assets it trades, reducing the 
market  liquidity  of  the  assets.  When  these  assets  themselves  serve  as 
collateral  for  the  loans  taken  on  by  the  institution,  the  situation  can 
precipitate an adverse feedback loop as decreased market liquidity tightens 
funding liquidity conditions, and vice versa. The literature also describes a 
feedback mechanism between capital problems and liquidity problems.  See, 
e.g.,  Allen  and  Gale  (2004).  When  the  financial  sector  runs  into  liquidity 
problems, triggered by runs by lenders, the sector sells assets whose prices 
then reflect an illiquidity discount. The lower asset prices lead to losses that 
deplete  capital,  further  compromising  liquidity.  The  critical  point  that 
emerges  from  this  literature  is  that  the  liquidity  of  assets  is  endogenous, 
while  in  the  Diamond  and  Dybvig  analysis  the  market  illiquidity  of  assets 
held by banks is taken to be fixed.  This leads to the important conclusion, 
namely, that it can be misleading to measure the liquidity of assets during a 
quiescent period if one is interested in a liquidity measure that can inform 
about financial crises. Importantly, it is the liquidity mismatch that matters, 
the market liquidity of the assets, i.e. their price impact in times of crisis, 
relative to the maturity structure of the liabilities. Note the difference to the 
maturity  mismatch  concept.  Holding  30  year  Treasuries  bonds  financed 
overnight involves an extreme maturity mismatch but the liquidity mismatch 
of such a position is limited as U.S. Treasuries typically appreciate in times 
of crisis. 
 
Gorton  and  Pennacchi  (1990)  point  out  that  the  function  of  the  banking 
system is to issue (informationally insensitive) liquid short-term debt claims 
against  illiquid  assets.    That  is,  functionally  banks  produce  “liquidity”  in 4 
 
much the same way that utilities produce electricity.  Bank equity holders 
earn  a  liquidity  premium  on  production  of  this  liquidity.    From  this 
perspective,  any  accounting  of  financial  sector  liquidity  should  have  the 
property that the sector has a negative aggregate amount of liquidity. 
 
Holmström and Tirole (1998) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) offer 
a  macro-prudential  analyses  of  aggregate  liquidity.    Both  papers  ask  the 
question  of  whether  the  private  sector  will  produce  the  socially  efficient 
amount  of  aggregate  liquidity,  both  offering  a  negative  answer.    In  an 
international context, Caballero and Krishnamurthy show that generally the 
private sector will go too far in liquidity production – issue too much short-
term debt claims – because individual actors do not internalize the effects of 
their actions on the probability of a macroeconomic crisis. Holmström and 
Tirole show that the state can play a beneficial role by itself issuing liquid 
claims, against its taxing power, in effect acting as a financial intermediary.  
Both of these analyses highlight the importance from a regulatory standpoint 
of  measuring  liquidity  in  a  fashion  that  can  be  aggregated  across  the 
financial sector and hence shed light on macroeconomic risks. 
 
To summarize, liquidity is constrained by financial frictions often in the form 
of limited pledgeability of future cash flows due to asymmetric information. 
The theoretical literature offers the following lessons regarding liquidity: 
 
1.  It is important to measure the liquidity of a given economic unit using 
data  both  on  the  market  liquidity  of  its  assets  and  on  the  liquidity 
promised  through  its  liabilities.  The  measures  need  to  explicitly 
condition on a possible stress event. 
2.  Liquidity is also a “response indicator”. It reveals firms’ or a sector’s 
reaction  to  shocks  and  whether  they  potentially  lead  to  adverse 5 
 
feedback loops in the form of liquidity spirals. A situation where the 
financial  sector  has  promised  more  liquidity  than  it  has  is  what  we 
should expect as the natural state of the financial sector. On the other 
hand, this natural state gives rise to the possibility of financial crises. 
3.  Measuring  the  aggregated  liquidity  of  the  financial  sector  can  be 
informative for macro-prudential policy. 
 
Liquidity in Practice 
 
We next turn to the practical issues in liquidity measurement. In practice, 
“liquidity”  does  not  match  up  neatly  with  the  representations  of  stylized 
models. We illustrate the issues through a series of examples. 
 
Liquidity Mismatch: Consider a bank with $20 of equity and $80 of debt, 
where half the debt is overnight repo financing at one percent and the other 
half is 5-year debt at 4.5 percent.  The bank buys one Agency mortgage-
backed security (MBS) for $50 (which is financed via repo at a zero haircut) 
and loans $50 to a firm for one year at an interest rate of 5 percent. 
 
What if the bank cannot renew the repo financing, and is forced to liquidate 
some of its assets?   Standard measures, such as leverage, will not pick up 
this liquidity risk. That is, they will treat the overnight debt and the 5-year 
debt, symmetrically.  One could construct a leverage measure that focused 
on  the  maturity  mismatch  in  this  example  –  e.g.,  a  short-term  leverage 
measure – but this too may prove inadequate.  For example, suppose that 
instead of the Agency MBS, the bank owned $50 of private-label MBS, which 
is less liquid than the Agency MBS.  Now this bank has more of a liquidity 
mismatch, stemming from the asset side.  Thus it is clear that a liquidity 6 
 
measure needs to incorporate information from both the asset side of the 
balance sheet and the liability side, funding liquidity and market liquidity.    
 
Rehypothecation:  The bank lends $100 to a hedge fund for one day and 
receives a bond with a market value of $100 as collateral (a reverse repo).  
The bank then uses the bond as collateral to borrow $100 in the overnight 
repo market.  (Whatever else the bank is doing we ignore for purposes of 
the example.) 
 
This bank, despite having a liability structure comprising of short-term debt, 
does not have liquidity risk. Suppose that the repo lender to the bank does 
not renew this repo. Then, the bank can also choose not to renew its repo 
loan  to  the  hedge  fund  and  thus  unwind  the  debt  position.  Again,  this 
example illustrates that it is important to use information from the asset side 
to measure liquidity.  Note instead that if the reverse repo loan to the hedge 
fund is for three days, then the bank will have some liquidity mismatch.  
 
Derivatives: Consider a firm with $20 of equity and $80 of debt; half the 
debt is overnight repo financing at one percent and the other half is 5-year 
debt  at  4.5  percent.  The  firm  buys  $100  of  U.S.  Treasury  securities  and 
writes protection (using credit default swaps (CDS)) on a diversified portfolio 
of 100 investment-grade U.S. corporates, each with a notional amount of 
$10; so there is a total notional of $1,000.  The weighted-average premium 
received on the CDS is five percent. 
 
Derivatives trade under the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
master  agreement.  This  agreement  usually  has  a  Credit  Support  Annex 
(CSA), a legal document, which sets forth the conditions under which each 
party  must  post  collateral.    Suppose  that  in  this  example  the  CSA  has 7 
 
collateral-posting  requirements  based  on  the  market  value  of  the  CDS 
position.  If the marks widen, i.e. when it is more likely that a firm or firms 
in  the  portfolio  will  default,  this  firm  will  have  to  post  collateral  to  the 
counterparty.    It  has  a  Treasury  bond,  which  could  be  posted,  but  which 
would then reduce the amount of asset liquidity held by the firm.  In the 
extreme, imagine that the entire Treasury holding is posted so that the firm 
no longer has any liquidity.  Then the only remaining asset the firm has is 
the CDS portfolio.  
 
As another  example of a liquidity event triggered by derivatives, consider 
the effect of a ratings downgrade. The CSA often prescribes that if the bank 
is downgraded during the term of the derivative contract, it will have to post 
more collateral, which again uses liquidity.  Moreover, if the firm had written 
many derivative contracts – i.e., the CDS as in the example, plus interest 
rate derivatives – the need for liquidity will apply to all derivative contracts.  
Thus, the downgrade is potentially a significant liquidity risk that arises when 
firms use derivatives. 
 
Credit Lines:  The bank has $20 of equity and $80 of 5-year debt. The bank 
buys $100 of U.S. Treasuries and offers a credit line to a firm to access up to 
$100.  
 
In this example, as with the derivatives example, the bank has no illiquidity 
problem currently. However in the event that a firm draws down the credit 
line, the $100 of Treasuries will convert into a less liquid bank loan.  Thus, 
this bank has acquired liquidity risk.   
 
Forwards vs. Futures: A (Brazilian) sugar producing firm writes a forward 
contract to deliver X amount of sugar after the harvest. Alternatively, the 8 
 
firm could have also bought a large futures contract on the exchange that is 
marked-to-market on a daily basis. 
 
In  this  example,  the  firm  is  naturally  hedged  against  sugar  price 
fluctuations,  as  it  is  a  major  sugar  producer.  Locking  in  the  price  via  a 
forward creates no liquidity risk or fundamental risk for the firm. However, if 
the firm opts for an exchange-traded futures contract instead, it is subject to 
margin calls as the sugar price varies. Hence, the firm has to hold large cash 
reserves for this case. 
 
Currency  Mismatch:  A  European  bank  has  (Euro)  20  $-equivalent  of 
equity,  40  $-equivalent  of  Euro  retail  deposit  funding  and  $40  of  US 
overnight commercial paper. The bank owns $100 of ABS.  
 
In  this  example,  the  bank  is  running  a  currency  mismatch,  owning  dollar 
assets funded by retail Euro deposits as well as dollar  wholesale funding.  
Suppose that money market funds refuse to roll over the commercial paper. 
In this case, the bank will not be able to keep its ABS position. 
 
Note that that the real issue here is the maturity of the dollar debt and not 
the currency mismatch. That is, if the firm had long-term dollar debt, the 
firm would have no liquidity risk.   
 
The Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) 
 
We next present a theoretical liquidity measure, informed by the academic 
literature on liquidity, and analyze its benefits in terms of assessing liquidity 
risk both from a firm and macro-prudential perspective. 
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There are two dates.  Date 0 is the ex ante date at which each firm makes 
risk and liquidity decisions by choosing cash assets and cash liabilities, as 
well  as  derivative  positions  and  off-balance  sheet  positions.    Derivative 
positions may have a market value of 0 at date 0, but are sensitive to the 
risk  factors.    At  date  1  a  state         is  realized,  one  of  which  may  be  a 
systemic  crisis,  depending  on  what  decisions  firms  have  made.    We  will 
define a liquidity index for each state as well as a summary liquidity index 
for date 0. 
 
Firm i chooses assets A
i and liabilities L
i.  The assets are a mix of cash, repo 
lending to other  firms, derivative exposure, outright asset purchases, etc.  
Liabilities include short-term debt, long-term debt, secured debt, equity, etc. 
We also consider hybrid contracts such as credit lines extended, which alter 
the firm’s assets when they are drawn down. 
 
Liquidity Risk Exposure and Cash Liquidity:  
We  determine  “liquidity  risk  exposure”  at  date  0  in  two  steps:  First,  we 
derive for each state at date 1 the “cash-equivalent” value of each asset and 
liability. Second, the liquidity risk measure at date 0 focuses on the, say 5% 
worst draws of nature. In this sense our t=0 liquidity risk measure follows 
the  same  method  as  standard  risk  measures  like  Value  at  Risk  (VaR)  or 
expected short-fall.  
 
Cash  Liquidity  for  a  given  stress  scenario:  More  specifically,  the  “cash 
equivalent value” in a specific state       after nature has moved to realize a 
particular stress-event for the firm is the value of the firm assuming that  
  Counterparties act most adversely. That is, parties that have contracts 
with the firm act to extract as much cash as possible from the firm 
under the terms of their contracts. This defines the liquidity liability.   10 
 
  The firm computes its best course of action, given the assumed stress 
event,  to  raise  as  much  cash  against  its  balance  sheet  as  it  can  to 
withstand the cash withdrawals. That is, the firm computes how much 
cash it can raise from asset sales, pre-existing contracts such as credit 
lines, and collateralized loans such as repo backed by assets currently 
held by the firm.  The computation assumes that the firm is unable to 
raise  unsecured  debt  or  equity  (see  below  for  how  to  account  for 
access to equity markets at some time in the future). The total cash 
raised is the liquidity asset.  
 
The net of the liquidity asset and the liquidity  liability  is the LMI for that 
state.  For  each  “relevant”  state         or  stress  scenario  the  LMI  is 
calculated. Examples of stress scenarios are: the firm is downgraded; the 
haircuts  on  the  firm’s  assets  rise;  the  market  for  securitized  assets  turn 
illiquid; all credit spreads rise; etc.  
 
Liquidity Risk: The date 0 liquidity risk measure focuses on the worst stress 
scenarios.  If  one  uses  expected  shortfall  liquidity  risk  measure  then  one 
considers the x, say 5, percent worst scenarios. Each of the worst scenarios 
gets the same weight. The “Value at Liquidity Risk” is  determined by  the 
scenario which is closest to the x percent worst scenario.  
 
In short, we assume that in each state       counterparties take the worst 
action and the firm finds the best response (defense action) after nature’s 
choice of  . With regard to the choice of nature we focus on the worst x 
percent.  
 
Our liquidity measure captures well the liquidity risk of all positions including 
derivatives  positions.  Indeed,  our  measure  is  related  to  the  margin  dollar 11 
 
amount  that  McDonald  (2012,  this  issue)  and  Acharya  (2012,  this  issue) 
propose.  In  this  sense  our  liquidity  measure  provides  a  unified  approach 
across various asset classes and liabilities.  
 
One attractive feature of our measure is that it can be expressed in terms of 
dollars like standard risk measures. This has the advantage that it can be 
aggregated  across  various  institutions  in  a  meaningful  way.  Note 
practitioners often use the maximum time an institution can survive without 
raising  new  funds  in  an  environment  in  which  counterparties  and  nature 
move against them. While this measure is useful for a single institution it 
cannot be easily aggregated across institutions.   
 
Before  delving  into  the  LMI  analysis  we  provide  (i)  some  examples,  (ii) 
details about how cash equivalent liquidity  -weights are chosen, (iii) some 
guidance as to how relevant stress scenarios   are picked and (iv) steps on 
how the date 0 liquidity risk measure is determined. 
 
Here are some examples to ground this definition.  
a.  If a firm has $100 of risk-free overnight debt, then the cash-equivalent 
of this debt is $100 because the debtor can extract $100 by refusing 
to roll-over the debt.  Note that this $100 liquidity liability applies in all 
states, because the $100 from overnight debt can be extracted in all 
states of the world.   
b.  If a firm has a CSA that allows counterparties to extract more cash 
collateral if the firm is downgraded, then only in the downgrade state 
is there a liquidity liability for the firm (equal to the maximum amount 
of collateral posted, as stipulated by the contract). 12 
 
c.  If  a  firm  has  $100  of  Treasury  securities,  then  the  cash-equivalent 
value of these securities is $100 because we assume that Treasuries 
are always liquid. 
d.  If a firm has $100 of MBS with a repo haircut in a good state of 5% 
and a repo haircut in a bad state of 15%, then the cash-equivalent 
value in the good state is $95, while it is $85 in the bad state. 
e.  If  a  bank  has  written  a  $100  credit  line  to  another  firm  that  is 
uncontingent,  then  the  “worst-case”  computation  means  that  the 
credit line is fully drawn down, resulting  in a $100 liquidity liability. 
Now the best response for the firm may be to take the resulting loan 
and raise cash against it (in the simplest case with cash from the same 
bank, or in more complicated cases through loan sales).  Suppose that 
the  firm  raises  $80  of  cash  against  the  loan,  then  the  $80  of  cash 
raised is offset against the $100 credit line drawn to give a liquidity 
mismatch of -$20. 
 
Liquidity  weights:  The  way  we  implement  the  LMI  is  to  assign  a  liquidity 
weight   
   to each asset and liability for each state of the world.  Assets are 
indexed  with  positive  j,  while  liability  j  takes  on  a  negative  value.  We 
normalize  super-liquid  monetary  assets  such  as  bank  reserves  and 
Treasuries to have a    
      of one across all states. For something like a 
mortgage-backed  security  (MBS),  we  can  imagine  measuring    
     as  one 
minus  the repo haircut on that  MBS in state ω.   Alternatively,    
    could 
measure the price discount that firm i has to accept if it immediately wanted 
to convert the asset into cash. The weights   
   measure the cash-equivalent 
value of asset j, as described above as the answer to the question, what is 
the  maximum  amount  of  cash  that  can  be  raised  against  a  given  asset?  
Aggregating liquidity across the asset side, one obtains firm i’s asset liquidity 
  
    for the different states of the economy.  We also measure the liquidity of 13 
 
the liabilities as   
     .  Overnight debt has liquidity of -1 in all states.  A 
derivatives contract has a weight        
       , in the state where the firm is 
downgraded or loses money on the derivative.  The weight here reflects the 
maximum  collateral  posted  in  that  state.    If  the  margins/haircuts  of  a 
collateralized  position  can  be  increased  from  say  10%  to  50%  at  the 
discretion of the financier, then essentially 40% of the position is financed by 
overnight debt. A credit line that is uncontingent has a weight that is the net 
between the liquidity lost when the line is drawn (weight = -1) and the asset 
liquidity from the loan made (weight>0).  This net number will be negative 
so that we consider it a liquidity liability. Common equity is   
           for all 
states  ω.  The  same  applies  to  long-term  debt.    Overall,  firm  i’s  liquidity 
position is   
      
        
   , which we note is a function of the state ω. 
 
An important consideration that arises with the liquidity weights is how to 
account for government insurance.  For example, is it appropriate to include 
liquidity that can be obtained from the discount window?  How should one 
handle  the  fact  that  government  insurance  of  retail  deposits  makes  such 
deposits far less run-prone?  We are interested in a measure of liquidity that 
can  indicate  when  a  systemic  crisis  is  more  likely.    Since  a  crisis  is  an 
equilibrium  outcome  of  an  economy  with  government  insurance,  it  is 
appropriate  to  take  measurements  that  include  government  insurance.  
Thus, the best response of a firm accounts for the possibility of going to the 
discount window and borrowing.  One can imagine a stress scenario as the 
following. Suppose that the discount window haircuts doubled, were subject 
to  increased  stigma,  etc.    But  still  liquidity  is  computed  assuming  the 
existence of the discount window. Second, we assume that retail deposits 
pose no liability liquidity risk.  This latter assumption comes from a great 
deal of evidence that in a macro-stress event, the banking sector receives 
deposits in a flight to safety (see Gatev and Strahan, 2006).  Note that pure 14 
 
micro  liquidity  risk  considerations  may  lead  one  to  consider  that  retail 
deposits  are  a  liquidity  liability,  but  that  is  the  wrong  perspective  from  a 
systemic risk standpoint.  
 
One further conceptual issue that needs to be dealt with in this computation 
is the time dimension.  The LMI can only be defined for some time period. 
An overnight LMI is a computation that assumes only overnight contracts are 
not rolled over, and that after that the firm is able raise equity, for example, 
to cover all other obligations. A 30 day LMI is a computation that assumes 
that all debt maturing in the next 30 is not rolled over, and that after the 30 
days, the firm is able to raise equity to cover further obligations. How should 
time  be  handled  and  what  is  the  relevant  time  frame  for  the  liquidity 
measurement? We try to incorporate the time dimension by adjusting the  -
liquidity weights. 
 
For  the  first  question,  we  proceed  as  follows.    Suppose  that  having  free 
access  to  liquidity  (e.g.,  being  able  to  access  equity  markets)  follows  a 
Poisson process. There is a probability θ that the firm is able to raise equity 
in any given day (in principle θ can be a different number tomorrow, the day 
after that, etc.).  Then, the LMI is based on the expected liquidity outflow 
going forward. Define the function f(t,θ) ∊ [0,1], where t=1 corresponds to 
“one day” and t=30 is 30 days, as the probability that the firm is unable to 
access free liquidity by date t. The probability is decreasing in t at a decay 
rate governed by the parameter θ. All liability contracts with payments due 
at date t have   
    equal to f(t,θ) times the   
   for the same contract if its 
payments were due at date t=1.  Thus, 30 day debt has   
     = -1 Х f(30,θ). 
This discounting structure has the property that standing at any date t>0 
where the firm still does not have access to free liquidity, the liquidity of a 
given contract is the same as at date 0.  15 
 
 
The  next  question  is  how  should  one  choose  θ?  We  turn  back  to  the 
academic  literature.    Models  such  as  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  and 
Gorton  and  Pennacchi  (1990)  identify  that  the  financial  sector  creates 
liquidity by issuing short-term debt claims.  We would like measures to be 
informative of how much of this  liquidity production  is  being done by the 
financial sector.  The theoretical models imply that the relevant short-term 
debt carries a liquidity premium.  Thus to map the models to practice, we 
need to identify what maturities of short-term debt carry a sizeable liquidity 
premium.  Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) document that Treasury 
Bills  with  less  than  3  months  to  maturity  carry  a  liquidity  premium.  On 
average, over a sample from 1990 to 2006, the premium on the 1 week Bill 
relative to the 6 month Bill is 32 basis points.  The premium is a non-linear 
function  of  time,  rising  quickly  and  hitting  about  5  basis  points  for  the  3 
month Bill.   
 
Thus, consider fitting the function f(t,θ) to the liquidity premium evidence 
from the Treasury Bill  market, so that the function is near zero by t=90.  
Note that the parameter θ can be part of the stress event (i.e. the state   , 
so that, in systemic risk states where market-measures of liquidity premia at 
all maturities rise, the measure naturally extends to incorporate more time 
into the construction of liquidity liabilities. However, the baseline can reflect 
the  average  liquidity  premium  evidence  as  captured  in  the  Treasury  bill 
market.   
 
The  determination  of  the  liquidity  weights  is  primarily  also  an  empirical 
question. There is a large empirical finance literature on liquidity that can 
provide some guidance to setting the liquidity weights.  For example, this 
approach will be closest to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) who 16 
 
measure  the  “liquidity  convenience”  of  assets  based  on  bond  market 
spreads.  For some security markets, another alternative would be to use 
repo haircuts.  For other assets, bid-ask spreads, price impact measures, or 
trading volume can be used as guides for the liquidity weights. 
 
However  the  base  case  is  determined,  different  liquidity  scenarios 
correspond to different specifications of weights, shocking one or more at a 
time.  Here again, the empirical finance literature can be used to guide the 
exercise.  There is a large literature that documents the time-series variation 
in  liquidity  measures  such  as  bond-market  spreads  and  stock-market 
liquidity  measures,  as  well  as  the  covariances  of  these  measures  with 
aggregate  risk  factors.    These  patterns  can  guide  the  choice  of  liquidity 
scenarios.  Consider  an ω macro state, described by movements in some 
underlying factors.  From historical empirical work, we know the covariance 
between the factors and the aggregate liquidity measures.  Thus, we can 
consider percentage deviations from the base-case set of liquidity weights 
based on moves in the aggregate liquidity measures.  
 
Scenarios.  The  dimensions  of  the  Ω  state  space  that  describes  a  firm’s 
asset, liability, and liquidity positions can be huge.  For practical reasons, 
suppose  that  liquidity  measurements  only  focus  on  states  s  within  an  S-
dimensional factor space, a subspace of Ω.  Factors consist of certain prices 
(risk factors) or liquidity/funding conditions (liquidity factors).   
 
Some examples of a liquidity risk scenario are the following: 
•  Firms  are  unable  to  access  the  market  to  raise  new  cash  for  one 
month, three months, and six months.  
•  Repo haircuts on some asset classes rise. 17 
 
• The syndicated loan market, or the securitization market, shuts down 
for some period. 
Once again, these are just examples, and the actual scenarios will depend 
on prevailing economic conditions.  
 
Date 0 Liquidity: The computations above describe   
  , i.e., in a particular 
stress  event.  In  practice,  it  is  infeasible  to  compute  a  complete  state-
contingent vector   
  . We are also interested in computing a single LMI at 
date 0 to summarize the liquidity position of the firm.  
 
The following example illustrates our main consideration in defining the date 
0 measure.  Consider a highly rated firm that engages in an OTC interest 
rate swap contract that currently requires no collateral to be posted.  From a 
liquidity standpoint, there will be states at date 1 where the firm will lose 
liquidity, but the firm at date 0  does not lose liquidity.  Now consider an 
exchange-traded  futures  contract  with  the  same  risk  profile  as  the  swap 
contract. In this case, the firm posts collateral at date 0 which results in a 
loss of liquidity.  We describe a measure that ensures that the possibility of 
the liquidity loss at date 1 in the derivatives case leads to a liquidity liability 
at date 0 commensurate to the margin posted on the futures contract. This 
example is similar to the forwards vs. futures example we discussed earlier. 
 
We measure the expected liquidity loss in the x% (e.g, 5%) worst case for 
the  derivatives  contract.  This  computation  is  analogous  to  the  expected 
shortfall measure common in risk management.  Then the liquidity liability at 
date 0 for the derivative contract is this expected liquidity loss.  For each 
state  and  asset/liability,  we  compute  this  expected  liquidity  loss.      The 
overall LMI weighs all of these scenarios.    
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This appears complicated because it requires one to compute each LMI for 
each scenario. However, note that the LMI computation is linear so that it is 
equivalent  to  computing  the  expected  shortfall  for  each  stress  separately 
and then simply aggregating across the stress events.  
 
We denote the liquidity position at date 0 as   
     For each ω, we can define 
   
      
      
   as the change in liquidity for that firm due to being in  that 
state or scenario.   
 
 
Analyzing the LMI 
 
The  LMI  measure  incorporates  the  ideas  from  the  academic  literature  on 
liquidity.  First, it explicitly accounts for asset and liability liquidity, as many 
papers have emphasized.  Second, since liquidity is measured conditional on 
a given ω macro state, the LMI explicitly accounts for liquidity risk – that is, 
the possibility that asset and liability liquidity are state-dependent.  Finally, 
as we discuss next, the LMI can be aggregated across firms and sectors.  
This is important for a macro-prudential assessment of systemic risk. 
 
Liquidity Aggregates. An interbank loan that is a liquid asset for firm-i is a 
drain  on  liquidity  for  the  borrower,  firm-j  (i.e.  negative  liquidity  weight).  
Aggregating across firm-i and firm-j the interbank loan will net out. Consider 
the net liquidity index for firm i,  
                . 
Again consider the sum,  
∑     
  . 
Summed  across  all  sectors,  the  liquidity  aggregate  equals  the  supply  of 
liquid  assets:  the  λ-weighted  sum  across  all  relevant  liquid  assets.    The 19 
 
aggregate  measures  are  analogous  to  Barnett  (1980)’s  Divisia  indices  for 
monetary  aggregates.  Barnett  devised  indices  to  weight  different 
components of the money supply based on their usefulness as a transaction 
medium.  The LMI index is similar but is based on both assets and liabilities, 
and has weights that reflect the financial liquidity of the asset and liability. 
 
The  aggregates  are  most  interesting  in  describing  the  liquidity  position  of 
particular  sectors.  We  may  expect  to  find,  for  example,  that  the  banking 
sector always carries a negative liquidity position, as suggested by Gorton 
and Pennacchi (1990), while the corporate sector or household sector carries 
a long liquidity position. The extent of liquidity transformation done by the 
banking  sector  may  also  be  informative  for  diagnosing  systemic  risk.  For 
example, in the period from 2000 to 2008, it is likely that the aggregate LMI 
grew substantially.  However, for systemic risk purposes, what would have 
been most interesting is a diagnosis that the aggregate growth reflected a 
growing mismatch between the banking sector and the other sectors in the 
economy. 
 
Intermediation  chains.  Note  that  the  aggregation  of  liquidity  given  a 
specific stress scenario   does only punish long intermediation chains to the 
extent  that    –weights  of  the  market  liquidity  of  assets  differ  from  the 
liability  -weights. If the weights are symmetric, i.e. in the case in which the 
weight of a loan from firm-i (asset for that firm) is equal to the negative of 
the weight of that loan to firm-j (liability for that firm),  then aggregation 
over  an  intermediation  chain  is  neutral.  However,  for  asymmetric  weights 
intermediation chains lead to a higher liquidity mismatch. 
 
For date 0 liquidity (risk) measure, the total liquidity in the economy shrinks 
as the intermediation chain lengthens. To see this, consider the stylized case 20 
 
in which two financial institutions only write one derivatives contract on a 
specific asset. The worst x%  -scenarios for one institution are the states in 
which  the  underlying  asset  moves  in  one  direction,  while  for  the  other 
institution the opposite scenarios are the bad scenarios. In other words, both 
institutions  focus  on  different  worst  scenarios  (and  ignore  their  favorable 
scenarios).  This  reduces  the  aggregated  liquidity  measure  as  long  as  the 
derivative  contract  doesn’t  hedge  other  risks.  More  generally,  longer 
intermediation  chains  significantly  reduce  our  liquidity  measure.  This  is  a 
desirable property, as it is widely thought that financial fragility is created by 
the long chains of assets and liabilities that underlie the securitization model 
(i.e., household mortgage, packaged into MBS, further packaged into CDO, 
and  then  serving  as  collateral  for  a  repo,  which  may  be  rehypothecated 
many times).  The aggregate LMI can measure this fragility. 
 
Systemically  Important  Institutions.  New  banking  regulations  require 
greater oversight and higher capital requirements for systemically important 
institutions.    One  cut  at  judging  who  is  systemically  important  is  to  rank 
institutions by size of assets. However, this type of ranking suffers from all 
of the shortcomings of relying on balance sheet entries for asset holdings 
which  we  have  discussed  earlier.    Economically,  it  is  more  meaningful  to 
judge firms in terms of their magnitude of their risk exposures and liquidity 
exposures.  Thus, the LMI index at the firm level can provide guidance on 





We have described and analyzed the benefits of the LMI, a liquidity metric. 
Since  liquidity  plays  a  central  role  in  systemic  crises,  the  LMI  can  be 21 
 
informative  about  systemic  risks.    To  close,  we  describe  an  important 
challenge in the use of the LMI to analyze systemic risk. 
 
In practice, the liquidity weights   
   are endogenous to the state.  For the 
purpose of measuring the risks for a firm, it is appropriate to take the   
   as 
exogenous; in a similar manner that it is appropriate to take market prices 
as exogenous when measuring the capital of a bank.  However, for macro-
prudential purposes it is important to  understand how    
   depends on the 
state.  From a conceptual standpoint, we think of the   
   as akin to “market 
prices.”    The  behavior  of  agents  in  the  economy  plus  market  clearing 
conditions  describes  the  liquidity  weights.  For  example,  if  the  liquidity  of 
assets  is  dependent  on  the  financial  health  of  a  key  set  of  financial 
intermediaries,  then  data  on  how  the  capital/liquidity  of  these  financial 
intermediaries depends on the event ω can be useful in endogenizing the 
liquidity weights.  From this standpoint, the LMI data needs to be fed into an 
economic model that endogenizes liquidity in order to fully describe systemic 
risk.    We  discuss  the  connection  between  measurement  and  modeling  in 
Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2012).  
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